Tag Archives: Frisk

Norman v. State

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JOSEPH NORMAN, JR. v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Watts, March 27, 2017,
Car Stop- Odor of Marijuana- Without more, an odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle does not allow police to frisk the occupants

Plurality
(Main opinion- Watts with Hotten)
(Join in judgment only- Greene)
(Concur- Adkins with Barbera- not reasonable to believe passenger involved in drug dealing where car smells of mj)
(Dissent- Getty with McDonald – probable cause for drugs should be RAS to frisk)
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US v. Shaquille Robinson

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAQUILLE MONTEL ROBINSON
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (En Banc 11-1-4), Niemeyer, Jan. 23, 2017,
Frisk – During a forced police encounter, an individual need only be “armed and thus dangerous” for an officer to conduct a frisk

(Concur- Wynn- Armed and dangerous are independent factors, but RAS the suspect has a firearm satisfies the ‘dangerous’ requirement)
(Dissent – Harris, Gregory, Motz, Davis- Armed and dangerous are independent factors)
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State v. Sizer

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STATE OF MARYLAND v. JAMAL RASHEED SIZER
Court of Special Appeals, Moylan, Nov. 29, 2016,
Terry Stop – For Terry purposes, a “high-crime area” need not be as violent as Wardlow‘s south Chicago.

Affirmed on other grounds by COA

(Concur – Graeff- Agrees that stop was valid, evidence shouldn’t be excluded even if stop invalid, but disagrees and thinks the “but-for”/”attenuation” analysis is proper)
(Judge Moylan writes individually to explain the difference between Attenuation, Independent Source, and Inevitable Discovery)
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Sellman v. State

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DONZEL SELLMAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Greene, August 24, 2016,
Frisk – Nervousness, presence in a high crime area, conflicting stories, and questionable identity provided did not amount to reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Frisk was illegal.

(Dissent – Watts, joined by Battaglia – would find RAS for frisk based on totality of circumstances, would credit arresting officer as did fact finder)
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Chase v. State

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IRA CHASE v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Battaglia, August 19, 2016,
Terry – Keeping a suspect in handcuffs for a short period of time after they have been frisked does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest where there is still a reasonable belief that the suspect may have a weapon inside a nearby vehicle.

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US v. Zachary Foster

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ZACHARY M. FOSTER
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Diaz, May 24, 2016,
Terry – Where defendant reached for his pocket after being asked if he had a weapon, reasonable to stop and frisk where there was a recent 911 call reporting a discharge of firearms in a high-crime area, defendant was the only one seen there, and defendant avoided eye-contact with the officers.

(Concur – Wilkinson – Terry‘s a pretty awesome case and I just want to talk about it a bit.)
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US v. Ezekiel Gardner

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EZEKIEL DONJA GARDNER
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Keenan, May 18, 2016
Miranda – Unhandcuffed suspect removed from vehicle was not under “de facto arrest” requiring Miranda when officers told him that they had received information that he had a firearm and asked him whether he had “anything illegal.”

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United States v. Shaquille Robinson

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAQUILLE MONTEL ROBINSON
US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, Harris, Filed Feb. 23, 2016,
VACATED, EN BANC – opinion by Niemeyer

Seizure – “Because West Virginia authorizes the public carrying of weapons, reasonable suspicion that [an individual] was armed did not by itself justify a Terry frisk”

(Dissent by Niemeyer – 1) The standard is armed and THUS dangerous, 2) the possibility of a valid firearm license did not acceptably minimize the danger to officers, and 3) RAS is not the negation of all possible innocent conduct)
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