DEANDRE RICARDO WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Battaglia, Filed Dec. 18, 2015,
Miranda – “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know.” held to be ambiguous and insufficient to invoke right to remain silent.

(Dissent: McDonald, Barbera, Adkins – “I don’t know” was a separate statement; didn’t modify “I don’t want to say nothing.” Therefore not ambiguous.)

Secondary holding:
Voluntariness – Presenting suspect with two alternate characterizations of criminal conduct is not improper inducement in obtaining confession

On Miranda issue:

(PG Police Dept. questioning murder suspect)
[SERGEANT MCDONALD]: It’s not confusing. Let me break it down to you like this… (begins to explain)

[WILLIAMS]:
I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know,—

[SERGEANT MCDONALD]: But you don’t have to say nothing.

[WILLIAMS]:
Yeah.

[Williams is then read his Miranda rights and speaks with police]

Held: “[T]he addition of ‘I don’t know’ to the preceding sentence of “I don’t want to say nothing” created ambiguity as to whether Williams wanted to invoke his right to remain silent.

Miranda (Invocation)- If an accused makes a statement concerning the right to counsel “that is ambiguous or equivocal” or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights. (Quoting Davis v. US)

Miranda (Invocation)- The test applied, generally, using an objective standard, is whether a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of the right to silence.

Miranda (Invocation)- Contrast Ballard: “You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this.” (held to be unequivocal invocation of right to attorney; “You mind if” was seen as a colloquialism and not an actual question)

On voluntariness issue:

[DETECTIVE HARRIS]: …[I]f I were you, I would not want us to leave here thinking that you walked in that house,popped this dude, premeditated, walked in there, ‘I’m going to kill this cat,’ take everything in the house, and roll out. You may never see outside again if you let us leave here thinking that.
…
[DETECTIVE HARRIS]: It could be as simple as a robbery gone bad, or a flat out cold blooded first degree murder. It’s as simple as that. Robbery gone bad. First degree murder. Prove it.

[WILLIAMS]: I’m going to tell you all.

(gives a statement regarding the events)

[WILLIAMS]: I mean, am I ever going to see the street again? You all know.

[SERGEANT MCDONALD]: Look, dude. We can’t get into that.

[DETECTIVE HARRIS]: We’d love to.

[SERGEANT MCDONALD]: We’d love to, we can’t. We’re not allowed to go down that road, at all, and I’m not going to go down that road because I can’t.

Statement (Voluntariness)- “[U]nder Maryland criminal law, independent of any federal constitutional requirement, if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory statement will be to his advantage, in that he will be given help or some special
consideration, and he makes remarks in reliance on that inducement, his declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore inadmissible.” (Quoting Hillard)

Hillard test (two-prong):
1) Did the police make “a threat, promise, or inducement”? (express or implied)
(This is an objective test: would a “reasonable person in the position of the accused” be “moved to make an inculpatroy statement upon hearing the officer’s declaration”? “[A]n accused’s subjective belief that he will receive a benefit in exchange for a confession carries no weight under this prong.”)

2) If prong 1 is satisfied, was there “a nexus between the promise or inducement and the defendant’s confession”?
(It is up to “the court to determine whether the accused relied on that inducement in making the statement he or she seeks to suppress”)

Statement (Voluntariness) “[D]eception short of an overbearing inducement is a valid weapon of the police arsenal.” Given that limitation, police “are permitted to trick the suspect into making an inculpatory statement.”

Statement(Voluntariness)(Dicta) – False advice as to the possible penalties is a factor affecting the voluntariness determination (“but that is not in issue in the
present case”)

In Dissent, J. McDonald writes for CJ. Barbera and J. Adkins:

This dissent’s position is that “I don’t know” was a repetition of his earlier claims that he didn’t know why he was there or what was going on and was not a modifier of “I don’t want to say nothing.”

It’s an interesting quasi-factual determination by an appellate court, but there appears to be ammunition for both sides of the argument. The dissent suggests that, had the officer not spoken over the suspect, the suspect’s intent would have been more clear.

The dissent also takes issue with the police suggestion that Williams was premature in asserting his right to remain silent. While a suspect can not assert his right to remain silent at any point, doing so within “the context of custodial interrogation” causes his Miranda rights to attach.