Part 2 of the 8 Criminal Opinions from the Court of Special Appeals (and a bonus crime-related opinion):
ROBERT LOUIS COSTEN, III v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Meredith, Filed September 3, 2013,
http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/1471s11.pdf
Jury Trial Waiver- Under Valonis, reversal required where judge failed to determine and announce on the record that the waiver of a jury trial is made “knowingly and voluntarily”
CHARLES THOMAS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Graeff, Filed Sept. 4, 2013,
http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/2071s11.pdf
Attorney Work Product- “Fact” work product (material gathered for trial, including witness statements) is discoverable while “opinion” work product (attorney’s mental process) generally is not.
Other notes from the case:
– Where defense investigator took taped statements from witnesses, not error for judge to decide that those statements were intended to be used at trial and mandate discovery
– Noting Oregon case: “if defense counsel, even though not certain, can ‘reasonably predict’ that she will use certain exhibits to impeach a State’s witness, she must give timely discovery to the prosecutor”
– And a Washington case: “(a prosecutor “intends to use” a document for purpose of the discovery rule where the State is “aware of the document and there is a reasonable possibility that the document will be used during any phase of the trial”)
– Where prior inconsistent evidence is offered to impeach, Rule 5-613 controls and requires an appropriate foundation (witness given opportunity to explain, etc)
– Where prior inconsistent evidence offered as substantive evidence, Rule 802.1 controls (not mandating Rule 5-613 foundation)
– Other crimes evidence- 3-step analysis: 1) 5-404(b) exception or special relevance to contested issue, 2) clear and convincing evidence, 3) weigh necessity/probative-value against undue prejudice
– Pre-trial identification- two-stage analysis: 1) whether procedure was impermissibly suggestive and 2) if so, under the totality of circumstances was the identification reliable?
JOHN WAGNER v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Filed Sept. 4, 2013,
http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/2129s11.pdf
Restraints- No inherent prejudice when defendant’s shackles were not visible to jury
Other notes from case:
– Voir Dire- Not abuse of discretion to deny defense question of whether panel or their immediate relative or close friends had been victim of violent crime where court asked whether any member of panel had “strong feelings” about robberies/homicides
– Photo Lineup- not “other crimes evidence” where photo lineup wasn’t “obviously” mug shot (contrasted with standard front/profile used in other case)
– Other crimes evidence- not “other crimes evidence” where witness stated she knew defendant wanted to rob someone because he said the same thing he had said before when they went out to rob
– Other crimes- not “other crimes evidence” when defendant went out to buy drugs after robbery; evidence that defendant shared in proceeds of robbery was probative of his participation in the robbery
– Mistrial- Where statement that defendant was “locked up” was isolated, unsolicited and unlikely to cause significant prejudice, not error to deny mistrial
– Statements- A defendant is not generally entitled to admit an exculpatory/self-serving statement
– Jury instruction- While a trial court is required to instruct on the applicable law, they are not required to instruct on presence or absence of most evidentiary inferences
– Restraints- Defendant may be restrained to prevent the defendant’s escape, protect those in the courtroom, and maintain order. Unless one or more factors outweigh prejudice, physical restraint is inappropriate.
– Restraints- Requiring a defendant to wear shackles during the rendering of the jury verdict, after the jury has reached a guilty verdict and the presumption of innocence has been overcome, is not inherently prejudicial
Other related:
MEREDITH CROSS v. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Court of Special Appeals, Zarnoch, Filed Sept. 3, 2013,
http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/1290s11.pdf
Police officer married convicted murderer and was fired. Because limit on freedom to marry/freedom of association was indirect, and because the police had a rational basis for the policy, termination upheld.