IN RE: DAVID P.
Court of Special Appeals, Wright, Sept. 27, 2017,
Arson- Lighting a match and placing it on a brick porch is not enough evidence to prove specific intent to burn down a house.
The Court tries to look down on the police, prosecutor, and trial court by grandly showing them that charging isn’t so difficult; the answer was right in front of you the entire time! It’s… harassment!
Except… no, it isn’t! If COSA doesn’t think that someone repeatedly coming to a porch to set fire shows intent of arson then I’m pretty sure it won’t find that someone repeatedly answering a door manifests “a reasonable warning or request to stop.”
After all, the facts laid out stated:
“Nada then followed David to his house, at 121 Chestnut Street, with the intention of informing his mother about what had happened. However, Nada returned home without speaking to anyone at David’s house.”
So… try again.
Also, how is it a good idea to publish a juvenile’s home address in a published opinion?
Facts From the Case
In 2016, Nuzhat Nada was at home in Salisbury, MD at apx. 7 pm when she heard a noise at her door. She went to the door, but only saw someone running away. Later that evening, she heard the noise again. Once again, she opened the door, but did not see anyone. She waited by the door until she heard the noise again and opened the door, finding David P. running away from her doorstep.
She followed David to his house, but did not make contact with anyone there.
She then returned to her house, when she heard a noise on her porch again. When she opened the door, she saw two matches burning on her porch.
While “a lot of wood and cones” were on the porch, the matches were on the brick porch over a foot away from the house and feet from the wood.
Nada stood and watched the matches to make sure that they didn’t set anything on fire and called the police.
David P. was eventually charged with attempted arson and reckless endangerment.
A juvenile court found facts sustained on attempted first-degree arson and reckless endangerment.
David P. appealed, arguing that there was not enough evidence presented at trial to convict him.
Law from the Case
Held: The Court of Special Appeals agreed. Arson requires the specific intent to do harm to property; reckless actions are not enough.
First Degree Arson – A person may not willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn:
(1) a dwelling; or
(2) a structure in or on which an individual who is not a participant is present.
Arson – A “dwelling” is a structure with at least one part adapted for an individual to live overnight. It is still a dwelling if nobody is actually inside.
Arson – A “structure” is “a building or other construction, a vehicle, or watercraft.”
Arson – A “structure” includes a: barn, stable, tent, public building, public bridge, or railroad car.
Arson – “Maliciously” has a special meaning under the arson statutes: “acting with intent to harm a person or property.”
Mens Rea- General Intent – If a crime only makes it illegal to perform an action, it’s generally considered a “general intent” crime.
Mens Rea- General Intent – A suspect commits a “general intent” crime if he intentionally performs the illegal action. It’s irrelevant whether or not the suspect intended something to happen because of what he did.
Note: The “battery” version of 2nd-degree assault is a “general intent” crime. If you intentionally cause your fist punch someone, you have committed the crime of 2nd-degree assault. To commit a 2nd degree assault, it doesn’t matter if you intended to kill the other person or just knock them back a bit.
Mens Rea- Specific Intent- A “specific intent” crime requires that you have a reason or purpose in mind when you commit the illegal action.
Note: The “assault with intent to cause serious physical injury” version of 1st-degree assault is a “specific-intent” crime. Punching someone isn’t enough to commit a 1st-degree assault. To commit a 1st degree assault by punching someone, you have to punch them with the intent that it cause them serious physical injury.
Arson – Arson is a “specific intent” crime. Intentionally setting a fire isn’t enough to commit the crime; you have to set the fire with the intent to cause harm to a structure.
From the Case: “The mere striking and laying of a match on a nonflammable surface alone does not show intent to start a fire.”
From the case: The Court viewed the facts as suggesting David was “a reckless juvenile playing with matches, rather than” someone who lit the matches “for no purpose other than to set fire to the building.”
Attempt – An attempt to commit a specific-intent crime requires the same specific intent as the attempted crime.
Reckless Endangerment – A person may not recklessly engage in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another
Note: Reckless endangerment does not apply to use of a motor vehicle (other than discharging a firearm from one) or product liability
Serious Physical Injury – Under both the Assault and Reckless Endangerment statutes, “serious physical injury” means physical injury that:
(1) creates a substantial risk of death; or
(2) causes permanent or protracted serious:
(i) disfigurement;
(ii) loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or
(iii) impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
Reckless endangerment- A “substantial” risk doesn’t have to be “almost certain to occur.” A “substantial risk” can be “an unnecessary risk that his conduct might cause the harmful result.”
Note: Having a loaded firearm is not “reckless endangerment.” Even firing a loaded firearm near others is not reckless endangerment when there is no substantial likelihood that it will hit anyone. In contrast, a suspect creates a “substantial risk” with a firearm when he puts a loaded and operable firearm in a position to discharge lethal force at an individual.
From the case: Because the matches were so “overwhelmingly likely to burn themselves out” on the brick porch, as they did, they created “no appreciable risk of spreading harm to the house, much less the person inside.”