Long v. DPSCS

FRANKLIN DAVID LONG v. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

Court of Special Appeals, Salmon, Sept. 28, 2016,
Ex Post Facto Law – MSORA – Requiring a sex offender to register quarterly instead of annually (as was required by law at the time of sentencing) is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law


Defendant was required at sentencing to register as a sex offender. The law required this registration be for life, but no specific time frame was mentioned at sentencing. He subsequently received a pamphlet saying that he had to register for ten years. He now complains that the pamphlet he got a month after sentencing entitled him to only register for ten years.

The CoSA here gets very realpolitik, dropping a note on page 15 suggesting (albeit accurately) that the opinions of judges no longer sitting on the CoA are less relevant.

Ex Post Facto Law – In construing Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights, the intent-effects test is to be applied.

The intent-effects requires:
1) a determination as to whether the law is intended to punish or “to simply establish civil regulatory proceedings.”
2) Does the effect of the statute “override[] the legislative purpose [in such a way as] to render the statute punative”?
– Is there affirmative disability or restraint?
– are these added requirements historically viewed as punishment?
– Is a finding of guilt required to comply?
– Will the statute promote retribution and deterrence? (written “deference” in the opinion, but probably a typo)
– is the behavior targeted already a crime?
– is there an alternative purpose other than punishment?
– does the burden appear excessive in relation to that alternative purpose?

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