TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES
Supreme Court of the United States, Roberts, June 22, 2018,
Search – Police aggregation of Third-Party information about a suspect’s movement over a one-week period required a search warrant

(Dissent – Kennedy with Thomas and Alito – Third-party doctrine should control; no search)
(Dissent – Thomas – “Whose property was searched”? Should be the operative question)
(Dissent – Alito with Thomas – “the Court destabilizes long-established Fourth Amendment doctrine”)
(Dissent – Gorsuch – New test needed)

Facts:
In 2011, police officers arrested four men suspected of robbing a series of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Detroit.
One of the men confessed that, over the previous four months, the group had robbed nine different stores in Michigan and Ohio. The suspect identified 15 accomplices who had participated in the heists and gave the FBI some of their cell phone numbers; the FBI then obtained additional numbers that he had called around the time of the robberies from the suspect’s phone records.
Based on that information, federal prosecutors applied for court orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for Timothy Carpenter and several other suspects.
The orders sought records that would include the “Cell Site Location Information” (CSLI) showing which “tower” the cell-phone was interacting with when calls were being made or received (and thus showing an approximate geographic location for the person holding the phone).
A magistrate judge reviewed the orders and approved them based on a finding of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the … records… sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” (a lower standard than the probable cause evidence will be found that would be necessary for a search warrant).
The first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, which produced records spanning 127 days.
The second order requested seven days of CSLI from Sprint, which produced two days of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio.
Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements over the four-month period.
Carpenter was charged with a dozen counts related to robbery and use of a firearm.
Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site data showing his location because it was obtained without a search warrant, but the trial court denied Carpenter’s motion.
At trial, an FBI agent used the CSLI to present maps showing that Carpenter was in the area at the time of four of the robberies.
Based on this and other evidence, including the testimony of seven co-defendants who testified that Carpenter was the leader of the operation, Carpenter was convicted.
After his conviction was upheld on appeal, Carpenter requested review by the Supreme Court.

Held: The Court held that, because of the privacy issues involved, a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.

Fourth Amendment – The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Searches – The areas protected by the Fourth Amendment include police intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area” such as a home or person. It also extends to protect areas where an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”

From the Case: The “basic guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment are protecting privacy from “arbitrary power” (generally requiring search warrants establishing probable cause, for example, to keep the government from being able to search whatever it wants) and protecting the people from “too permeating police surveillance.” The Court noted that technology has “enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes,” and thus moved here to limit the ability of police to conduct surveillance through technology.

From the Case: “Society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not— and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”

Searches – Using technology for the “limited use” of tracking an individual during a single trip would not require a search warrant because it does not intrude into someone’s privacy the same way that extended surveillance does.

Note: The Court did not decide where the line is drawn precisely. The Court noted that a search-warrant would not be required for a single-use tracking and would be required for anything a week or longer. Between those points was left open by the opinion.

From the Case: “It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”

Practice Note: Cell-phone “pings” and short-term tracking using third-party information (rental-car GPS, etc) would likely not qualify as a “search” and would not require additional legal justification (unless a physical device was being planted on a vehicle). Beyond that, especially tracking longer than 24-hours, would likely depend on the facts of the case, including: the number of data-points gathered and whether that information could have been obtained by officers conducting physical surveillance.

Searches – Third-Party – “Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology… or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”

From the Case: “Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

Searches – Justification – A search must generally be justified based on a search-warrant or an exception to the search-warrant requirement.

CSLI – Searches – Because long-term CSLI is a search, an officer seeking long-term CSLI would generally need to obtain a search-warrant in order to do so

Practice Note: This should not impact Baltimore City officers, since local judges decided some time ago to require search-warrants for CSLI orders.

Note: The Court noted that, outside of CSLI, a search warrant would also be required “in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.” The “legitimate privacy interest” here would include facts similar to the case here: where those records demonstrate practically 24/7-surveillance over an extended period of time.

CSLI – Searches – The standard search-warrant exceptions apply to CSLI, including an exception for exigent circumstances.

From the Case: “Even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual’s cellsite records under certain circumstances.” This includes exigent circumstances such as “the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.”