IHAR SOTNIKAU v. LORETTA E. LYNCH
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, King, Jan. 24, 2017,
Deportation – Virginia’s involuntary manslaughter offense is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)is therefore inappropriate

Facts:
Sotnikau was admitted as a permanent resident in 2008. In 2010, he and his friend were drinking when his friend fell down steps into a river. Sotnikau then left without notifying anyone and his friend died. He subsequently pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to five years in prison.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) Makes deportable an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within 5 years of admission if that crime carries a sentence of a year or more.

A crime involving moral turpitude “must involve conduct that not only violates a statute but also independently violates a moral norm.” [W]e have noted that ‘moral turpitude’ refers generally to ‘conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved.

Those circumstances include criminally reckless conduct, which “reflect[s] a willingness to disregard the risks inherent in the conduct.” Criminally negligent conduct, on the other hand, is not included because “there [is] no intent required for conviction, nor any conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”

An involuntary manslaughter conviction can be secured in Virginia without proving a conscious disregard of risks attendant to the offender’s conduct; such a conviction can be predicated on proof that the offender failed to appreciate or be aware of the risks emanating from his conduct.