UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAQUILLE MONTEL ROBINSON
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (En Banc 11-1-4), Niemeyer, Jan. 23, 2017,
Frisk – During a forced police encounter, an individual need only be “armed and thus dangerous” for an officer to conduct a frisk

(Concur- Wynn- Armed and dangerous are independent factors, but RAS the suspect has a firearm satisfies the ‘dangerous’ requirement)
(Dissent – Harris, Gregory, Motz, Davis- Armed and dangerous are independent factors)

Role reversal from panel opinion. Nieymeyer wrote the dissent in the panel opinion while Harris wrote the panel majority opinion joined by Davis

Frisk – An officer who makes a legal traffic stop and has reasonable suspicion that one of the automobile’s occupants is armed may frisk that individual for the officer’s protection and the safety of everyone on the scene.
(Reversing previous panel opinion holding that the officer needs reasonable suspicion BOTH that the suspect is armed AND that the suspect is dangerous).

Facts:
An anonymous caller called the Ranson, West Virginia police department and reported that he just “witnessed a black male in a bluish greenish Toyota Camry load a firearm [and] conceal it in his pocket” while in the parking lot of the 7-Eleven. The caller reported that the man with the gun got into a Camry driven by a woman and the Camry left, heading south.
The area where this occurred was just outside the “the highest-crime area” in the city and the officers knew the 7-Eleven was the site of numerous drug transactions.
Officers responded and saw a bluish-green Camry with a female driving and male passenger, later identified as Robinson. Neither were wearing a seatbelt, so police conducted a traffic stop and approached.
Police had Robinson exit the vehicle. As he was exiting the vehicle, police asked Robinson if he had any weapons on him. Instead of responding verbally, Robinson “gave [the officer] a weird look or, more specifically, an ‘oh, crap’ look[].”
At this point, police conducted a frisk for weapons and recovered a loaded gun from the front pocket of Robinson’s pants. After the frisk, police recognized Robinson as a convicted felon and placed him under arrest.
Robinson was subsequently convicted, but on appeal a panel of the 4th Circuit held that the frisk was illegal.
The entire 4th Circuit (En Banc) then took the case and issued this opinion, reversing the earlier panel opinion.
The core of the opinion is that “The danger justifying a protective frisk arises from the combination of a forced police encounter and the presence of a weapon, not from any illegality of the weapon’s possession.”
Moreover, “traffic stops of persons who are armed, whether legally or illegally, pose yet a greater safety risk to police officers.”

The Stop:
Anonymous Tips – Anonymous tips are treated as less reliable than information provided by a citizen. The identity of the tipster is unknown, so they can’t be held accountable if they lie and their reliability can’t easily be gauged.
Anonymous Tips – Investigative Stops- Without more, an anonymous tip stating only that an individual is armed with a gun is NOT enough to stop a suspect.
Anonymous Tips – Investigative Stops- However, if an anonymous tip shows that it IS reliable, either by explaining HOW the tipster knows the information or by predicting future behavior, it might provide reasonable suspicion for a stop.

The Search:
Frisks- A frisk is not a search for evidence; it is a search for weapons usually limited to a person’s outer garments.
Frisks- The point of a frisk is to “allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” and so it may be performed regardless of whether the weapon in question is legal/permitted or completely illegal.
Frisks- A frisk may be carried out if:
1) The suspect is legally stopped by the police (either a “Terry” stop or a traffic stop)
2) The officer “reasonably suspect[s] that the person is armed and therefore dangerous”

Stop/Frisk- The Court here notes that an officer may frisk a LEGALLY STOPPED suspect if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed. Reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) that someone is armed is NOT enough to stop them UNLESS there is also reasonable suspicion that they are committing a crime (or have just committed a crime or are about to commit a crime).