Matthew David Meyer v. State of Maryland
State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera
Court of Appeals, Greene, Filed Dec. 22, 2015,
Probation – Condition barring driving not a separation of powers issue
Overruling Sheppard v. State (1996)
There is some decent language with regard to non-standard conditions of probation.
Conditions of Probation – “In fashioning conditions of probation, the Judiciary may impose reasonable conditions of probation where appropriate to curtail a criminal-defendant’s physical ability to operate a motor vehicle. ”
Conditions of Probation – “conditions of probation must be reasonable and have a rational connection to the offense”
Conditions of Probation – probation conditions should seek to “accomplish the objectives of sentencing—punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation”
Conditions of Probation – Consent can not make an invalid probation condition valid
(stop reading here if you want to stick with reading binding authority; what follows is opinion/analysis)
Whether this is a case of “bad facts make bad law” or some other issue, the “logic” of this opinion beyond “Meyers is a bad guy and shouldn’t drive” is hard to find.
The Sheppard CoA opinion reversed here in Meyer was itself based on Towers, an earlier CoSA opinion.
The Meyer court declares that there is a “stark contrast” between Sheppard and Towers, but paints a picture far more akin to the difference between eggwhite and cottonwhite.
Which still could have been a concise 12 page opinion had they merely stuck with the actual difference instead of 43 pages of false contrasts and declared victories.
There is one, narrow point on which the CoA could have legitimately rested its opinion. The CoA could have just said: “Because the legislative scheme creating MVA’s licensing authority contemplated judicial interference on some level (such as where it imposes interlock as a condition of probation for a DUI under CP 6-220), we find no separation of powers issue when a sentencing court forbids driving altogether.”
It may not be the most cogent argument, but it’s the strongest found within the Meyer opinion and is the only case in which the CoA finds a legitimate contrast between Sheppard and Towers.
Every other contrast made could be argued just as strongly for both cases.
And, having stated my point, here’s where I could have stopped, but…
In Sheppard, at sentencing for a defendant’s 3rd DUI/DWI the trial court stated,
“I’m going to order her to not operate a motor vehicle while on probation. Even if the [M]otor [V]ehicle [A]dministration gives you back your license, you cannot drive, because my order says you can’t.”
In Towers (92 Md. App. 183(1992) — no hyperlink available), a pharmacist “had been selling prescription drugs to drug dealers for approximately five years because he feared that they would harm his family… [after which time he] got greedy and kept dealing for the money.”
At the time of the plea, the trial court said, “[w]e didn’t issue [the license to practice pharmacy] to you and we can’t take it away.” However, upon learning at sentencing that Towers’ license was only suspended for a year, the trial court changed its mind.
I find it appalling that the Pharmacy Board would consider ever giving you back a pharmacy license. That’s the[ir] business but I know this much, you should not work in a pharmacy without Court permission even if you have your license and the reason is Mr. Towers, not that I propose to set myself up as a Super Pharmacy Board but you can’t be trusted with the license. Obviously you succumbed to temptation once and there’s a good chance you’d do it again. You’d be a marked man so you can’t expect at least while you’re on probation to be working in a pharmacy by yourself again. At least not without the Court’s permission.
So, other than the legislatively approved (and in some cases mandated) interlock exception, what is the “stark contrast” between the two?
After all, the instant court derides the trial court in Towers because he “in effect, placed the judiciary in a position superior to that of the Executive branch, even though the General Assembly had clearly carved out a very specific role for the administrative agency in that circumstance.”
Which… is precisely what happened in Sheppard.
The Meyer court first contrasts the two by stating that
Unlike Towers, the facts in Sheppard did not evidence a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. No direct challenge to the licensing authority existed. The no-driving condition itself did not usurp the authority of the MVA nor did the judge attempt to order the MVA to suspend Sheppard’s driver’s license. Simply put, the no-driving condition did not invalidate the driver’s license. Critically, the sentencing judge sought only to restrict the defendant’s physical ability to drive, which is different than a court ordering the formal suspension of one’s driver’s license. Consequently, the Sheppard Court should have decided the case solely on abuse of discretion grounds, and not on separation of powers grounds.
There’s a lot in that paragraph.
To start with: while license-surrender does contrast with certain cases, like the 2nd Circuit case MENTIONED in Towers, it does not in any way have to do with the actual facts of Towers. The Towers court did not “invalidate” Towers’ license to practice pharmacy; it merely restricted his ability to actually practice pharmacy. The written condition of probation was “Do not work in a pharmacy without Court’s permission even if you have a license…”
Had this been the end of the Meyer court’s inquiry into the matter, it would have created a clear line test regarding separation of powers: did the sentencing court require that the license be surrendered? If yes -> separation of powers issue. If no -> no separation of powers issue.
But that’s not the end…
The Court then notes that nothing in the Transportation Article explicitly restricts a sentencing judge’s ability to “place restrictions on one’s driving privileges as a condition of probation.” Therefore, the CoA notes, the executive and judicial branches have “shared authority to regulate driving privileges….” which is certainly an interesting way to look at it. The Court doesn’t explain how legislative delegation to the MVA of authority to regulate driving privileges is not an implication that it’s the MVA’s exclusive authority.
If the presence of the word “clearly” in an argument provides a reader with a canary in the coal-mine of logic, the lines that follow should cause some panic: “The Sheppard Court clearly overlooked the shared authority of the two branches in this instance… we overrule Sheppard because its rationale grounded in the separation of
powers doctrine was clearly wrong.“
In the section dedicated to Towers and the Separation of Powers doctrine, the CoA explains that Towers can be distinguished from Sheppard because the trial court in Towers directly challenged the licensing authority while the trial court in Sheppard did not.
Here’s the contrast drawn:
[In Towers, the] sentencing judge expressly undermined the authority of the State Board of Pharmacy, an administrative agency established by the Legislature and responsible for regulating the pharmaceutical profession, by prohibiting the pharmacist-defendant from working in a pharmacy without the court’s permission even if the State Board of Pharmacy reinstated his pharmacy license… The probation condition was an intentional disregard of the explicit role of the State Board of Pharmacy because the sentencing judge,in effect, placed the judiciary in a position superior to that of the Executive branch, even though the General Assembly had clearly carved out a very specific role for the administrative agency in that circumstance.
So… what’s the difference between that and the Sheppard sentencing court disregarding the MVA’s decision?
[The Sheppard sentencing court’s] no-driving condition did not interfere with or undermine the licensing authority of the MVA, but, rather, only regulated Sheppard’s standard of conduct in a reasonable manner for the duration of the probationary period.
Ummm… what?
The CoA explains that this is all part of the “sensible degree of elasticity” involved in the separation of powers doctrine.
Along the way, Leopold is painted with the inelastic brush.
Courts telling people they can’t run for office? Inelastic
Vehicle Emissions Program? Elastic
Delegating legislative authority to MVA? Elastic
Governor allowing executive employees to bargain collectively? Elastic
Sheppard? Elastic
What do these things have to do with each other? The CoA doesn’t quite explain, but most of them have to do with cars… so maybe the CoA is explaining that the separation of powers doctrine is elastic when applied to cars and inelastic in all other cases not related to the executive branch’s internal bargaining agreements.
Identifying the various flaws involved in this opinion might take an entire series (continuity issues, inequivalence of compared conditions, failure to apply facts to the stated principle, etc), and I’m not quite willing to do that for this opinion.
In short: The CoA thinks it’s a fine idea for sentencing judges to limit driving, but isn’t so hot on extending that to other administratively regulated activities. Why? Because driving.