JOVAN MAURICE BRICE v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Woodward, Filed Nov. 25, 2015,
Prohibited Person – Regulated Firearms – “There is no language in [PS 5-144(a)(1)] requiring a defendant to know that he is disqualified.”
(ed note – Bad legal analysis, so careful leaning too hard on this one)
The Court’s analysis is a bit off here. PS 5-144 is clearly a specific intent crime, but the question is the nature of that “specific intent.” Is it, as the Court suggests, “knowing possession”? Or, as the language suggests, “knowing illegal possession”?
PS 5-144(a)(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a dealer or other person may not:
(1) knowingly participate in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm in violation of this subtitle
Which the Court paraphrases as:
Under the express language of the statute, a defendant may not “knowingly participate in . . . possession . . . of a regulated firearm.” PS § 5-144(a)(1). There is no language in the statute requiring a defendant to know that he is disqualified.
Read this way, the mens rea is clearly “knowing possession.” However, the astute reader will note that the court skipped over the word “illegal.”
Of course, “illegal” could modify only “sale,” in which case it would read as “illegal-sale, rental, …” however, this is wrong because 1) grammar and 2) reading it this way would mean that it is illegal to knowingly participate in an illegal-sale OR to knowingly participate in a purchase. And, since this results in an illogical outcome, it’s more likely that “illegal” is meant to modify each item
And so the court’s paraphrase SHOULD read: a defendant may not knowingly participate in … illegal … possession … of a regulated firearm.
In which case “knowingly” would modify “participate” and “participate” would modify the act of “illegal possession.” In this event, “knowingly” would apply to both “illegal” and “possession.”
That being said, it’s sufficiently ambiguous that actual statutory interpretation should be used (history and recodification examined, etc). While I might come back to this at a later time, I’m not pulling the legislative file tonight (or even going through the digital archives).
What the court does instead is use the holding in McNeal v. State which interpreted PS 5-133(b)(1).
PS 5-133(b)(1) reads:
a person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person:
(1) has been convicted of a disqualifying crime;
As you can see, PS 5-133(b)(1) is a general intent crime, which explains the holding in McNeal that one need only have knowledge of possession of the handgun.
But the Court glosses over that and skips straight to the hallmark of the intermediate appellate court: “even if”.
In addition, even if knowledge of disqualification is required, the evidence adduced by the State at trial supports a rational inference that appellant knew that he was not permitted to possess the handgun
Ok, enough picking on the CoSA…
Wait, nevermind.
Appellant argues that Deputy Jackson did not have “reasonable articulable suspicion” that appellant committed a traffic violation. Because Deputy Jackson pulled appellant over for a traffic violation, probable cause is the correct standard under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
Words…
Lost…
As we all know, RAS IS the appropriate legal standard for a traffic stop.
A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a “seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure, officers need only “reasonable suspicion…”
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)
Prior Bad Acts – No error in admitting testimony that officer was called to a location “for a domestic disturbance.” Without more detail, does not come within the definition of other “crimes, wrongs, or acts.” No link to any person or allegation as to what the “disturbance” was.
Traffic – TR 21-604(c) – Where there is a requirement to signal before a turn if “any other vehicle might be affected by the movement,” this includes signaling if police vehicles might be affected
Voir Dire – Where defense counsel waives the right to object to voir dire but retracts that waiver part way through, court must balance equity of recalling waiver.
Voir Dire – When there are police officer witnesses for the State, police witness questions requested by a defendant are mandatory
Voir Dire – A trial court may decline to ask voir dire: not directed at a specific ground for disqualification, which are merely ‘fishing’ for information to assist in the exercise of peremptory challenges, which probe the prospective juror’s knowledge of the law, ask a juror to make a specific commitment, or address sentencing considerations. Citing Washington v. State
Voir Dire – Questions revealing cause for disqualification include:
– minimum statutory qualifications for jury service
– juror’s state of mind “as to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably
liable to have undue influence over him” such as “biases directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant.”