DEVON EDWARD MORGAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Appeals, Adkins, Filed April 23, 2014,
Jury Waiver- The required pronouncement of “knowing and voluntary waiver” need not immediately follow a Rule 4-246 colloquy regarding waiver of jury trial rights.

Limiting Valonis, which requires reversal if prior to waiver of the jury trial right the trial court fails to “determine[] and announce[] on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”

J. Adkins, who joined with J. McDonald’s dissent in Valonis, authors this opinion.

The relevant facts of this case are as follows:

– The defendant’s case was called
– The court conducted a jury-trial waiver inquiry
– The court stated “All right. I find that he has waived his right to a jury trial. The case will be set in as a bench trial tomorrow morning.

This would have been in violation of Valonis’ strict interpretation of Rule 4-246(b), but the defense attorney interjected and stated that a plea was in the offing. The case then continued as follows:

– The case was re-called and the court stated “You just a few minutes ago waived your right to a jury trial, which you would be entitled to in this particular case…”
– The court then went on to conduct a full colloquy regarding the voluntariness of the plea waiver, including “And if you were to have a trial, whether a court trial or a jury trial, you could refuse to testify…”
– At the end of the colloquy, the trial court stated “All right. I find it’s a knowing and voluntary plea. I’ll accept the plea.”

The goals of Valonis, according to the Court, were twofold: to make sure that a meaningful determination was made regarding jury-trial waiver and to make sure that this finding of “knowing and voluntary” waiver was reflected in the record.

The Court of Appeals held that, given: (1) the thoroughness of the jury waiver colloquy, (2) the temporal proximity of that with an equally thorough plea colloquy, and (3) the judge’s mention of the jury trial waiver at the commencement of the plea colloquy, “we conclude that the court’s
announcement that defendant’s actions were “knowing and voluntary” at the end of the plea colloquy was sufficient to establish, for purposes of appellate review, that the judge analyzed the disposition and appearance of Morgan in order to determine Morgan’s actual understanding and voluntariness for both the jury waiver and the plea.”

J. Watts joins in the judgment only but authored no opinion.