Criminal Law:
CHAD EASON FROBOUCK v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Filed June 6, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/2061s11.pdf
Short Version (Consent Search): Where landlord called police to a warehouse, told police that he had reclaimed the property after the lease expired, and upon arrival the door was open and the landlord was inside, the landlord had apparent authority to give consent to search. Police were not required under the circumstances to inspect the lease or inquire further about how the premises had been retaken from the lessee.
Notes on consent searches from the case:
– When the State argues that a search was conducted pursuant to consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent, in fact, was given freely and voluntarily
– Generally speaking, a landlord cannot consent to the search of his tenant’s property when the lease is still valid
– Common authority to consent to a search is not derived “from the mere property interest a third party has in the property” searched; rather, such authority rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” And if a person with common authority over
the premises consents to a search of the premises, that consent is “sufficient to validate [the] search.”
– A valid consent to search may be oral
– Apparent authority exists when the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would “‘warrant a man of reasonable caution’” to believe that “the consenting party had authority over the premises”
– The doctrine of apparent authority:
• is not restricted to residences
• places responsibility on the officer to assess the situation critically. Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person giving consent lives there, the surrounding circumstances could be such that a reasonable person would not act upon it without further inquiry
• applies only to mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. i.e. An investigator’s erroneous belief that landlords are generally authorized to consent to a search of a tenant’s premises could not provide the authorization necessary for a warrantless search.
Crime-Related Opinion:
FINANCIAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court of Special Appeals, Filed June 6, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2013/1400s11.pdf
Short Version (Forfeiting Bail): Our bail/bond system makes no sense. Posting bail for someone that fails to appear results in a forced loan from the surety to the government until the defendant is brought back in (even if the government is the one that locates him), at which point the money is returned minus the expenses incurred.
Actual holding: Where a surety posts bond for a defendant and the defendant fails to appear after 90/180 days, the surety is entitled to a refund (less expenses incurred) if the defendant is EVER brought back to court, regardless of “[w]hether the defendant is produced through the efforts of the State, the surety, or the voluntary act of the defendant.”
Side note: The statute has since been changed so that the surety is only entitled to refund if they paid the penalty sum in a timely fashion.