STATE v. TYRES KENNARD TAYLOR
Court of Appeals, Filed May 21, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2013/60a12.pdf
Short version: Defendant tried switching lawyers on day of trial, but new lawyer would have required a postponement to take the case. Court listened to reason and denied. CoSA reversed, circuit court judgement affirmed.

Holding (Discharge counsel): Pursuant to Rule 4-215(e), where defendant requests discharge of counsel, “[t]he trial judge has the duty to listen, recognize that he or she must exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant’s explained reasons are meritorious, and make a rational decision.” However, the trial court is not required to “make sense of nonsense” in understanding defendant’s reasons for discharging counsel.

Notable: Defendant’s pre-trial statement of dissatisfaction with attorney or desire to switch counsel are “red flags” inviting trial court to clarify whether defendant is requesting to discharge counsel.

JEFFREY ROBERT VALONIS v. STATE and ANTHONY TYLER v. STATE
Court of Appeals, Filed May 20, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2013/52a12.pdf
Holding (Waiver of jury): Rule 4-246(b) requires that prior to waiver of the jury trial right “the court determines and announces on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.” Failure to do so is reversible error.

MICHAEL DAVID GORDON v. STATE
Court of Appeals, May 20, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2013/43a12.pdf
Holding (Hearsay): Trial court allowed testimony by officer regarding Defendant’s date of birth where defendant provided police officer with his driver’s license upon request, thereby adopting the “hearsay” date of birth listed on it. No clear error. Affirmed.

Notable: Suggested that providing a license to an officer in a situation other than proving authorization to drive a vehicle is an adoption of both the name and date of birth listed on the license.

ANTONIO L. BROWN v. STATE
Court of Appeals, Filed May 20, 2013
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2013/58a12.pdf
Holding (Post-conviction): Where absence of inculpatory DNA evidence was noted at trial, post-conviction testing confirming victim’s DNA and lack of defendant’s DNA did not amount to “substantial possibility” he would not have been convicted.