Voluntariness
Short version:
the State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to a search.
A person temporarily detained in a Terry stop may validly
consent to a search of his person, papers, or effects, see Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 [*373] L. Ed. 2d 229,
238-39 (1983) and cf. Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 530, 781 A.2d 787, 811
(2001) ("a person in custody may still give valid consent to a
search"), and that presupposes that it is permissible for an officer to
seek such consent. Indeed, in Berkemer v. McCarty,
supra, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S. Ct. at 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 334, the Supreme
Court expressly noted that one of the purposes of a Terry stop is to "try
to obtain information confirming [***21] or dispelling the officer's
suspicions."
Collins v. State, 376
Burden
the State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the
evidence.
McMillian v. State, 325
Based on promise:
As a matter of Maryland common law, "if an accused is
told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory
statement will be to his advantage, in that he will be given help or some
special consideration, and he makes remarks in reliance on that
inducement, his declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily
made and therefore inadmissible." Taylor v. State, 388
Hillard embodies a two-prong test:
(1) did the officer "promise or imply to a suspect that he or she
will be given special consideration from a prosecuting authority or some other
form of assistance in exchange for the suspect's confession," and (2) did
the suspect "make a confession in apparent reliance on the police
officer's statement." Although both prongs must be satisfied before an inculpatory statement may be held to be involuntary, the
State has the burden of showing that an inculpatory
statement is voluntary -- that it was "not made in reliance on a
promise or inducement made by a police officer or agent of the police." Taylor
v. State, 388
Mere evidence of an offer by an interrogating officer to
recommend to prosecuting or prison authorities that a suspect receive drug
treatment, while in prison, unconnected to any promise of leniency in
prosecution or sentencing, or to advocate for such leniency, is not in and of
itself an improper promise of a benefit or special advantage. Harper v. State,
162
because of
drugs/alcohol
A defendant's mere mental deficiency is insufficient to automatically make his
confession involuntary. Rather, a confession is only involuntary when the
defendant, at the time of his confession, is so mentally impaired that he does
not know or understand what he is saying. Harper v. State, 162
Mental impairment from drugs or alcohol does not per se
render a confession involuntary." Whether the defendant was under the
influence of a drug at the time of giving the incriminating statement is a
factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of that
statement." A court may admit a confession into evidence if it
concludes that it was freely and voluntarily made despite the evidence of
mental impairment." Harper v. State, 162
Although the appellant claimed at the hearing that he had
been under the influence of marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine when he was
interviewed, and that he was sleep deprived, there was evidence that he was
able to recount in great detail what transpired at the police station and had
the presence of mind to consistently use the name "Francis McClain"
instead of his real name. Harper v. State, 162
The police did not seize respondents when they boarded the
bus and began questioning passengers. The officers gave the passengers no
reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers' questions.
When Officer Lang approached respondents, he [*204] did not brandish
a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that
respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite,
quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or
she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter.
Where there was no application of force, no intimidating
movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking
of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. “It
is beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be
constitutional.”
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and
consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in
full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the
rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for
the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes
place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
State v. Green, 375
P/o stops speeder, returns license, tells driver free to go, driver then consents to search. Valid.
An individual is not "seized" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment if he engages in a consensual encounter with police. State
v. Green, 375
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.
As long as police officers do not "induce cooperation
by coercive means," they may "pose questions, ask for identification,
and request consent to search luggage" even if they have no basis for
suspecting that a particular individual has engaged in criminal activity. The
Supreme Court has "long approved consensual searches because it is no
doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been
permitted to do so." State v. Green, 375
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure,
even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact
between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount
to a seizure of that person. State v. Green, 375
A list of factors that courts have found useful in determining
whether an individual's encounter with police was consensual: the time and
place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were
uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or
isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she
was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of
a crime, whether the police retained the person's documents, and whether the
police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to
a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.
State v. Green, 375
At around 10:00 that morning, accompanied by two other
officers, Wooden went to the motel and knocked on the door to Room 109. When
appellant, one of the two occupants of the room, asked who was there, Wooden
responded "maintenance" and asked to come in to check the thermostat.
Appellant opened the door. As soon as the door was opened, Wooden, who was in
plain clothes, displayed his police badge, identified himself as a police
officer, and asked if he could come in and talk with appellant. Wooden also
said that, upon the opening of the door, he detected the odor of burnt
marijuana, but he did not enter the room based on that information. Appellant
orally agreed to let Wooden in and backed away from the door in order to allow
Wooden and one of his colleagues to enter.
Brown v. State, 378
In the present case, at no time during the questioning was Appellant arrested,
nor do we believe that a reasonable person would be led to believe to the
contrary. He was told that he may become a suspect. Although detectives made
him aware of the inconsistencies in his statements and, in fact, obtained an
admission from him to a lie about the time he left his workplace on the
afternoon of 3 December, the record of the questioning reveals no coercion of
the type the federal or
Abeokuto v. State, 391
The next and more difficult question is whether the consent was voluntary in
the constitutional sense. The burden of proving that the consent was freely and
voluntarily given is upon the State. Consent that is coerced by threats or
force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority, is not
voluntary. Coercion that defeats voluntariness may be by explicit or implicit
means, by implied threat or covert force. Although custody is a factor to be
considered in determining voluntariness, it is not dispositive, and a person in
custody may validly consent to a search.
In the instant case, there was a display of force by the police. At first
contact, both officers had their revolvers drawn. Lieutenant Nugent holstered
his weapon immediately after Reinhardt emerged from the bus and had been patted
down. At the time the statement of consent was made, Corporal Foracappo had his revolver out, but not pointed at anyone.
The detention at this point had been relatively brief, and the police had made
no threats, nor claimed authority to enter the bus. We think a most important
consideration is the fact that the consent was volunteered, and was not given
in response to a request by the police. It is difficult to conceive of the
consent merely being an acquiescence to the commanding presence of the police
when the idea for the search originated with the persons being detained. We
conclude that Judge Fader did not err in sustaining the search upon the
additional ground of consent. Doering v. State, 313
The officer at that point stopped the vehicle, advised the petitioner that he was acting suspiciously and asked to see his driver's license and registration card. Upon their production, Corporal Wortman ran a radio check to determine if there were any outstanding warrants in the driver's name. While waiting for a reply transmission, the officer, according to his testimony at the hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress, again approached Mosley stating that: "[he would] like to look in [the] vehicle Mosley v. State, 289 Md. 571, 573 (1981)
Further we conclude from our independent review of the
entire record, that the trial court was correct in its determination that the
consent given was not the byproduct of coercion or duress, direct or implied. Mosley
v. State, 289
After running a warrant and license check, the officer
returned to the appellee's car, issued him a warning
ticket, and returned his license and registration. At this point, the officer
advised the appellee that he was free to leave and
informed him that, although he was making traffic stops, his primary function
was to interdict the transportation of illegal drugs on the
custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate
a coerced confession or consent to a search." State v. Clowney,
87
Consent is involuntary if it has been obtained by coercion.
Consent is coerced if it is obtained by threats or force, or if it is granted
only in submission to a false claim of lawful authority. Other circumstances
that may render consent involuntary arise when the person giving consent has
been affirmatively misled about his or her option to refuse the search. State
v. Clowney, 87