The Car Stop

Short version:

An officer only needs reasonable articulable suspicion to seize a vehicle

Pretext stops are fine and also require reasonable articulable suspicion

Everyone who remains in the vehicle has standing to challenge a car stop

An officer can order anyone inside of a stopped car out of the car for officer safety

An office can search a car with probable cause… yes, even the trunk.

Belton allows police to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both "occupants" and "recent occupants." 453 U.S., at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860. Indeed, the respondent in Belton was not inside the car at the time of the arrest and search; he was standing on the highway. In any event, while an arrestee's status as a "recent occupant" may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search, n2 it certainly does not turn on [**2132]  whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him.

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (U.S. 2004)

A traffic stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment where the police have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 361 (2007).

In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine announced in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) applies to cases in which officers have reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual is armed, noting that “If a suspect is ‘dangerous,’ he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983)

“The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” Id at 1049.

The area which may be searched for weapons includes “closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-1 (1981).

In Cross, the police had information from an unnamed citizen that the Defendant was armed. The Court of Special Appeals held that police examination of the glove compartment, even though locked, was a valid Terry frisk of the vehicle where police peeked through a 1-inch opening in the glove compartment and observed a handgun. Cross, 165 Md. App. at 182.

If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should discover contraband, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances. Michigan v. Long at 1050.

If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, including the trunk. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). See also Wilson v. State, 174 Md. App. 434, 444 (2007).

Stopping a car

When is a car stopped?

- Lights and siren

- Lalalala

- lalala

History of the car stop

Began with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrant not necessary for search of vehicle because the vehicle can be quickly moved)

The constitutionality of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

Standard to stop a vehicle:

Whether police are allowed to conduct a traffic stop, “the appropriate minimum standard is reasonable articulable suspicion.” State v. Williams, 401 Md. 676, 687 (2007).

The appropriate minimum standard for a car stop is reasonable articulable suspicion, even with a “pretext” stop where the officer is actually looking to investigate an infraction other than the violation observed. State v. Williams, 401 Md. 676, 685 (2007).

Standing to challenge a search/seizure:

A passenger who remains passively in a vehicle that is stopped by police is seized when the driver of the vehicle is seized for purposes of 4^th Amendment analysis. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2007)

A passenger has no way of signaling submission to the police (and therefore cannot be seized for 4^th amendment purposes) while the car is still moving on the roadway, but once it comes to a stop the passenger may submit by staying inside. Brendlin, Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2007)

What may be searched:

If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. This applies broadly to all containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999)

Arresting a passenger:

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (probable cause to arrest front passenger where drugs found in back seat armrest)

A car passenger will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-305 (1999)

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) The constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers for the stopping of the vehicle. “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”, “The Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”

Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598 (2000) defendant, driving a car with North Carolina tags, was stopped for following too closely by a State Police sergeant assigned to drug interdiction. There were 70 air fresheners suspended from the rear view mirror. Sergeant ordered def from the car and “consensually frisked” him. Officer impermissibly prolonged the Whren traffic stop. In determining whether a police officer has exceeded the temporal scope of a lawful traffic stop, the focus will not be on the length of time an average traffic stop should ordinarily take nor will it be exclusively on a determination of whether a traffic stop was literally "completed" by the return of documents or the issuance of a citation. The reasonableness of each detention is assessed on a case-by-case basis and not by the running of the clock. Once the Sergeant advised defendant that he had been stopped for following too closely, the defendant acknowledged his infraction and apologized for it and the Sergeant examined defendant’s driver's license and registration card, any further detention of the defendant to engage in a narcotics-related investigation was beyond the scope of what is permitted as part of a "Whren stop."

Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 (1999) – The purpose of a traffic stop is to issue a citation or warning and once that purpose has been satisfied, the continued detention of a vehicle and its occupants constitutes a second stop and must be independently justified by reasonable suspicion. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the 4th amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Defendant was stopped for speeding. Defendant gave officer license and registration and after completing warrant and license check, officer handed defendant a traffic citation. After citation was signed, officer returned license and registration to defendant. Defendant was not advised that he was free to leave. Officer then asked def to step to the back of his car and answer some questions. Defendant admitted that he and his passenger had been smoking weed and that the passenger was in possession of weed. When the passenger gave the officer a baggie of weed the officer searched the interior of the car and recovered from inside a book bag lying on the rear seat a gallon-size plastic bag of weed. Held that a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have believed that he was free to terminate the encounter with the trooper when the trooper asked him "if he would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle. At the moment the trooper prolonged the encounter beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop, to be more coercive than consensual. Second stop was not consensual or supported by reasonable suspicion.

State v. Green, 375 Md. 595 (2003) Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle at the conclusion of a traffic stop for speeding where, upon the return of his license and registration, the seizing officer informed the defendant that he was free to go prior to requesting consent to search and consent was not vitiated by waiting period of 15 - 20 minutes for back-up to arrive.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977) held that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882 (1997) held that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.

Dennis v. State, 342 Md. 196 (1996) – Passenger in vehicle stopped for traffic violation cannot be ordered to remain at the scene of the stop. There ordinarily is no reason to believe that a passenger in a vehicle is guilty, as an accessory or aider and abettor, of the traffic offense with which the driver may be charged, even when the offense is fleeing and eluding. Walking away from an automobile, even one stopped by the police, is not usually considered to be flight unless the person walking away does so in a manner indicative of flight. Exception: Stop occurring along a controlled access highway – passengers have no right to leave a stopped vehicle and to walk along a controlled access highway. See Maryland Transportation Code §21-509(a) and (j).

Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) A suspicionless canine scan of a vehicle of a lawfully detained driver does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable, articulable suspicion of the presence of illegal drugs is not required to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop.”

Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554 (2001) there is no rigid time limitations on traffic stops. Conducting checks of driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and possible warrants is reasonable in a traffic stop. Suspicionless questioning or other types of criminal investigative methods that take place while officers are waiting for the results of a computer check does not extend the duration of the stop and therefore does not violate Terry. A canine scan of a car, which is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, is permissible while officers are awaiting the results of a computer check. A positive alert by a trained canine to the presence of narcotics in a vehicle establishes probable cause to support a warrantless search of the vehicle under the Carroll doctrine. Held that the police did not improperly extend the traffic stop for speeding in order to permit a canine scan of defendant’s car.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) - During a routine traffic stop, officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket. The officer then searched the passenger compartment for contraband, removing and searching what defendant, a passenger in the car, claimed was her purse. Officer recovered drug paraphernalia in the purse. Held: Police officers with probable cause to search a car, as in this case, may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.

State v. Wallace, 142 Md. App. 673 (2002), aff’d 372 Md. 137 (2002) - a general canine alert to the presence of illegal drugs in a vehicle, without more, does not establish probable cause to search non-owning, non-driving passengers of that vehicle. Some additional substantive nexus between the passenger and the criminal conduct must appear to exist in order for an officer to have probable cause to either search or arrest a passenger.

State v. Funkhouser, 140 Md.App. 696 (2001) – positive alert by trained CDS dog to vehicle did not establish PC for search of fanny pack worn by driver of vehicle. Distinguished Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) authorizing warrantless search of property of auto passengers found inside of car under Carroll doctrine.

OVERVIEW: In addition to the driver and a back set passenger, defendant was a front seat passenger in a vehicle which was stopped for speeding. Upon a consensual search, a significant amount of cash was found in the glove compartment of the vehicle and drugs were discovered between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. Although defendant subsequently admitted that the drugs and cash were his, none of the vehicle occupants admitted to ownership of the drugs at the time of the search, and all three occupants were arrested. The United States Supreme Court held that the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of the drugs. It was an entirely reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs, and thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime of possession of drugs, either solely or jointly. It was also reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three occupants, in view of the likelihood of drug dealing in which an innocent party was unlikely to be involved.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (U.S. 2003)

Cracked windshield ok RAS:

the officer was not required to establish to his satisfaction, prior to the stop, that the windshield called into question the safety of the vehicle.
Muse v. State, 146 Md. App. 395, 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)