Speedy Trial Factors: Barker v. Wingo, 407
First
must show interval between accusation and trial is "presumptively
prejudicial" (lower courts draw line at 1 year) Doggett v.
It
is either a formal indictment or information or else
the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge
that engage the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
-
Length of delay
o
Greater length allowed for more complex cases
o
length of delay, in and of itself, is not a weighty factor
(Glover below)
-
the reason for the delay
-
the defendant's assertion of his right
o failure to assert the right
will make it difficult for a defendant
-
prejudice to the defendant.
o Presumptive prejudice where time excessive
o Actual prejudice weighed by
interests protected
§
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration
§
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused
§
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired
Barker
standards applied in MD. Glover v. State, 368
(Note that these are all for defendants who had already been convicted in another jurisdiction, not ones that were awaiting trial)
D arrested on B&E in Ann
Arundel, received letter that charges were dismissed, subsequently indicted by
grand jury. Picked up on other charges in Balt and served 6 months. Detainer on
him, speedy trial dismissal ordered. AA prosecution could have been instituted while Brady
was confined at Baltimore City Jail.
Brady
v. State, 291
D in
Smith v. Hooey, 393
From
July 1, 1960, to September 2, 1960, Dickey remained in Florida Jail on federal charges. The
Dickey v.
Not a violation of Speedy Trial:
Undoubtedly
a defendant is entitled to a speedy trial… but suppose he is charged with more
than one crime, to which does the right attach? He cannot be tried for all at
the same time, and his rights must be considered with regard to the practical
administration of justice… The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.
It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights
to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. It cannot be
claimed for one offense and prevent arrest for other offenses; and removal
proceedings are but process for arrest -- means of bringing a defendant to
trial. Beavers v. Haubert, 198
4th
Circuit cases
We
rejected Thomas's argument that the complaint, warrant and detainer activated
the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, finding that, HN5when an individual
is lawfully being held to answer to state charges, a "criminal complaint
coupled with an unexecuted arrest warrant and a federal detainer" do not
trigger the Act. Thomas, 55 F.3d at 148. See also Lee,
818 F.2d at 303 (finding that the Act requires a federal arrest upon a federal
charge and rejecting defendant's argument that filing of complaint, arrest
[**11] warrant and detainer on individual being held in state custody on
state charges constituted a federal arrest on a federal charge). n6 Accordingly, under the binding precedent of Thomas, the
Government's filing of a complaint, serving of an arrest warrant, and lodging
of that warrant as a detainer on January 9, while Woolfolk was in state custody
answering to state charges, did not activate the provisions of the Speedy Trial
Act.
The
basis for the holding in Thomas and Lee is HN6the notion of dual sovereignty,
"which recognizes that 'the federal government is not bound by the actions
of state authorities and that successive state and federal prosecutions are
constitutionally permissible.'"
MD
An
arrest warrant was issued against D on June 8, 1982, a detainer was filed
with the Division of Correction on June 11, 1982, and the original indictment
was filed August 5, 1982. The speedy trial clock began to tick as of June 11,
1982, the date the detainer was filed on the first indictment. Lee v. State, 61
Before
the intervention of arrest or formal charge the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
clause is not relevant.
State v. Gee, 298
the
issuance in itself of an arrest warrant as a prelude to arrest, even though
based, as it must be, upon probable cause to believe that the potential
arrestee committed the crime, does not suffice to activate the speedy trial
right.
State v. Gee, 298
"warrant" as used in Lawless referred to another manner,
in addition to indictment and information, by which a defendant could be
"formally charged" and thus become an "accused." As
Hamilton and Jones indicate, this would only occur when the defendant [**718] could be tried on the warrant-statement
of charges itself
State v. Gee, 298
On 3
January 1981, a police officer applied for a statement of charges with respect
to Gee. A District Court Commissioner granted the application and filed a
"Statement of Charges" whereby Gee was charged with the felony of
robbery with a deadly weapon and the misdemeanor of the use of a handgun in the
commission of the robbery. At the same time the Commissioner issued a warrant
for the arrest of Gee. On 4 February 1981, Gee was arrested on other charges
and was incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction. A
detainer against Gee was filed on 9 September 1981. A week later Gee requested
disposition of that case under the Intrastate Detainer Act. The arrest warrant
was served on him on 7 October 1981, and on 2 November an indictment was
returned. He was arraigned on 17 November and trial was set for 3 December.
Court assumed (did not decide) date was that of detainer, 9 September 1981.
State v.
Gee, 298
United States v. Martin, 104 Fed. Appx. 903, 905 (4th
Cir. 2004)
United States v. Perry, 1995
prisoner
in one state may, through written request, compel the disposition of "any
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer
has been lodged against the prisoner" by another state within 180 days
after the state prosecutor's office has received that request
State v. Smith, 316 Md. 223, 226 (Md. 1989)